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Weinstein: The Stakes Are High

THE STAKES ARE HIGH: THE PROFESSIONAL AND
AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION ACT IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VULNERABLE AND REFLECTS BAD
POLICY
Stephen Weinstein *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sports gambling is ubiquitous, despite the fact that gambling is
illegal virtually everywhere. In 2015 alone, $4.2 billion was legally
wagered through Nevada’s sportsbooks. 1 Although this number may
seem high, it pales in comparison to the conservative estimate of $150
billion illegally wagered on sports in the United States (“U.S.”) that
year. 2 Sports wagering was legal in the U.S. until Congress passed the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (“PASPA”),
prohibiting state-sanctioned sports wagering in almost all States and
driving the popularity of sports wagering to the black market. 3
Professional and amateur sports have long been considered
America’s pastime, and they continue to increase in popularity every
*Touro

College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2018; Fairfield University,
B.A., in Psychology, minor in Sociology, 2013. I would like to thank my notes editor Jessica
Vogele, Professor Eileen Kaufman, and Professor Rena Seplowitz as this Note would not have
been possible without them. I would like to thank Jessica for her advice, guidance, patience,
and dedication to my success throughout this writing process; Professor Eileen Kaufman for
her invaluable comments, recommendations, insight, and guidance through the intricacies of
this constitutional area; and Professor Rena Seplowitz for her advice, support, and guidance
throughout the editing process.
1 Dustin Gouker, Nevada Sportsbooks Took Record $4.2 Billion in Wagers in 2015, LEGAL
SPORTS REPORT (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/7902/nevada-record-sportsbetting-2015/. Nevada is the only state allowed to offer single game wagering.
2 Memorandum from Am. Gaming Ass’n to President-elect Donald J. Trump Transition
Team (Dec. 2016),
https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/FINAL_AGAMemo_TrumpTransitionT
eam.pdf.
3 28 U.S.C.A. § 3702 (1992); Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 2. Delaware, Montana,
Oregon, and Nevada are grandfathered in under a PASPA exception. See 28 U.S.C.A. §
3704(a) (1992).
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year. 4 Research conducted in 2015 revealed that 67% of U.S. adults
follow at least one sport. 5 However, professional football is America’s
favorite, evidenced by the fact that National Football League (“NFL”)
games garnered the top 43 of 50 spots for viewership out of all
televised sporting events in 2015. 6 The American Gaming Association
estimated that of the $90 billion wagered on NFL and college football
games during the 2016 season, $88 billion (98%) was wagered
illegally. 7 Although these estimates are not precise, due to obvious
legality concerns, it is likely that the increased popularity of watching
sports correlates with the growth in illegal sports wagering. In
addition, the prohibition against sports wagering through PASPA
drives a thriving gambling black market—the revenue of which is used
to fund “criminal enterprises involved in human trafficking,
racketeering, money laundering, extortion, and fraud.” 8 There is
clearly a need to regulate the sports wagering market.
Part II of this Note provides a background of the applicable
constitutional laws that led to the enactment of PASPA, a description
of its legislative history, and its resulting enforcement. Part III focuses
on a series of cases decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit called Christie I, 9 Christie II, 10 and Christie III, 11 involving the
constitutionality of PASPA. Part IV discusses the constitutionality of
PASPA and concludes that PASPA is unconstitutional because it
commandeers the States in violation of the Tenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.
Next, Part V discusses the policy concerns surrounding sports
wagering and why it should be legal. This part describes the self-

4 Pro Football is Still America’s Favorite Sports, THE HARRIS POLL (Jan. 26, 2016),
http://www.theharrispoll.com/sports/Americas_Fav_Sport_2016.html.
5 Id.
6 Paulsen, 2015 Ratings Wrap: NFL Dominates Year of Milestones, SPORTS MEDIA WATCH
(Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.sportsmediawatch.com/2016/01/most-watched-sporting-events2015-nfl-college-football-basketball-nba-womens-world-cup-viewership/.
7 Press Release, Am. Gaming Ass’n, UK Experts: Thriving Illegal Market and Lack of
Regulation Create Atmosphere Ripe for Manipulation (Sept. 27, 2016),
https://www.americangaming.org/newsroom/press-releasess/uk-experts-thriving-illegalmarket-and-lack-regulation-create-atmosphere.
8 Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 2.
9 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
10 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Oct. 14, 2015), on reh’g en banc, 832 F.3d 389 (3d
Cir. 2016).
11 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016).
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defeating purpose of PASPA, the legality of fantasy sports, the public’s
generally accepting view of gambling, the effect of PASPA on the
black market, and the impact that technological advances have had on
sports wagering. Finally, Part VI concludes that PASPA should be
repealed because it is unconstitutional and reflects outdated policy.
II.

BACKGROUND
A. The United States Constitution and Federalism

After the American Revolution, the Founders, wanting to
prevent tyranny associated with the concentration of power in a
national government, established federalism—the division of power
between the federal and state governments—as the backbone of the
U.S. 12 Congress governs according to its enumerated powers, which
is intended to limit the federal government’s powers. Congress derives
its enumerated powers specifically from Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution, which includes, inter alia, the “Power to lay and collect
Taxes;” 13 “raise and support Armies;” 14 “establish Post Offices and
post Roads;” 15 “borrow Money on the credit of the United States;”16
and “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 17 While Congress is given great
deference in the enforcement of its laws under the necessary and proper
clause, 18 the U.S. Supreme Court’s role is to determine the
constitutionality of these laws, thereby putting a great check on
Congress’s power. 19
One of Congress’s most important enumerated powers is its
power to regulate commerce 20 through three broad categories: 1) the
“channels of interstate commerce; 2) the instrumentalities, or persons
or things, in interstate commerce; and 3) activities that substantially

12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. X; The Founders and Federalism, U.S.
HISTORY, http://www.ushistory.org/gov/3a.asp (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1819).
19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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affect interstate commerce.” 21 Channels of interstate commerce are
the avenues of travel which include, but are not limited to, railroads,
highways, waterways, harbors, airports, and bridges, 22 while the
instrumentalities are the vessels used for interstate commerce, such as
airplanes, boats, and cars. 23 However, the third category—activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce—is most important and
will be the focus of this Note because it provides the broadest authority
for Congress to exercise its Commerce Clause power. 24 Specifically,
it allows Congress to regulate purely local activity if that activity is
“economic” as related to the production, distribution, and consumption
of commodities and if that activity, when aggregated, has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 25 Because Congress is given great
deference when regulating interstate commerce, “court[s] may
invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is
clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the
regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no
reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the
asserted ends.” 26
As provided in the Tenth Amendment, the States have
presumed sovereign power over all that is not prohibited by the
Constitution and not delegated to Congress. 27 However, under the
Supremacy Clause, whenever an inconsistency between a federal and
state law exists, the federal law reigns supreme, so long as that federal
law is constitutional. 28 As such, the Tenth Amendment is an
embodiment of federalism, as it represents dual sovereignty between
the States and federal government. 29 Where Congress does not have
the power to regulate, the States do. 30 This general governing power
is known as the States’ “police power,” allowing the States to establish

21 Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1507 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995)).
22 29 C.F.R. § 776.29 (2017).
23 Id.
24 Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003).
25 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125, 128 (1942).
26 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
28 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
29 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-14 (1999).
30 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
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and enforce laws protecting the welfare, safety, and health of the
public. 31
The Tenth Amendment has been interpreted to prohibit
Congress from commandeering the States. 32 Even though “Congress
has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power to directly compel the States
to require or prohibit those acts.” 33 To clarify, Congress cannot
“regulate state government’s regulation of interstate commerce.” 34 An
example of the anti-commandeering doctrine is exemplified in the
Supreme Court’s decision in New York v. United States. 35 There, a
federal statute required States to either provide for radioactive waste
disposal or take title to waste made within the State’s borders. 36
Otherwise, the States would incur monetary damages. 37 The Court
struck down this statute, holding that while Congress has the authority
to regulate interstate commerce directly under the Commerce Clause,
it did not have the authority to control state governments’ regulation
of interstate commerce of radioactive waste disposal. 38
Congress unconstitutionally commandeers state governments
if it “impos[es] targeted, affirmative, coercive duties upon state
legislat[ive] or executive officials.” 39 In Printz v. United States, 40 the
Supreme Court struck down the provisions of the Brady Act, a federal
statute, that commanded state and local authorities to perform
background checks on individuals seeking to purchase guns. 41 The
Court held that the “Federal Government may neither issue directives
requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States’ officers,” 42 reasoning that the States cannot be forced to

31

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997).
33 New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
34 Id.
35 505 U.S. 144.
36 Id. at 144.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 166.
39 Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS
OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 158, 158 (2001).
40 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
41 Id. at 935.
42 Id.
32
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“absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory
program” 43 and take the blame for possible program defects. 44
In contrast, the Supreme Court held in Reno v. Condon 45 that
the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (“DPPA”), “which
establish[ed] a regulatory scheme that restrict[ed] the States’ ability to
disclose a driver’s personal information without the driver’s consent,”
did not violate the Tenth Amendment. 46 Even though the DPPA
required time and effort on the part of state employees to learn and
execute the system, 47 the Court distinguished the DPPA from the
federal statutes in New York and Printz because the DPPA did “not
require the States in their sovereign capacity to . . . enact any laws or
regulations, and it d[id] not require state officials to assist in the
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.” 48 In
other words, the DPPA did not require or influence States’ regulation
of their own citizens, as it instead merely regulated States as owners of
databases. 49 The Court regarded the DPPA as a general applicable law
because it subjected States to the same federal regulation as private
parties. 50
In sum, Congress cannot commandeer a State’s legislature or
control its regulation of private citizens. 51 If Congress wants to pass a
law that governs the manner of private activities, it must provide the
States with a choice of self-enforcing the federal law or allowing the
federal government to enforce it instead. 52 Because Congress cannot
dodge accountability for federal policy, it cannot force state action to
implement a federal policy according to Congress’s instructions. 53

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id. at 930.
Id.
528 U.S. 141 (2000).
Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
Id.
Reno, 528 U.S. at 151
Id.; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
New York, 505 U.S. at 145.
Id. at 145-46.
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B. PASPA
PASPA prohibits sports wagering conducted by, or authorized
under the law of, any State or other governmental entity. 54
Specifically, PASPA states:
It shall be unlawful for [either] a governmental entity to
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or
authorize by law or compact, or a person to sponsor,
operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or
compact of a governmental entity, a lottery,
sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering
scheme based, directly or indirectly … on one or more
competitive games in which amateur or professional
athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on
one or more performances of such athletes in such
games. 55
Additionally, it authorizes the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and
any professional or amateur sports organization to commence a civil
action for illegal sports wagering, 56 allowing them to enforce
restrictions via injunctive relief against the States. 57
Congress passed PASPA to: 1) stop the spread of sports
wagering; 2) maintain the integrity of America’s national pastime of
amateur and professional sports; and 3) reduce the promotion of sports
wagering among America’s youth. 58 The Committee of the Judiciary,
when voting in favor of enacting PASPA, opined that the “legalization
of sports gambling would inevitably promote suspicion about
controversial plays and lead fans to think ‘the fix was in’ whenever
their team failed to beat the point-spread.” 59 The Committee viewed
sports wagering as a national problem that needed to be stopped before
it infected every State. 60
However, Congress undermined PASPA’s purpose when it
carved out exceptions for several States to either continue or enact

54
55
56
57
58
59
60

28 U.S.C.A. § 3702 (1992).
Id.
28 U.S.C.A. § 3703 (1992).
Id.
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555.
Id.
Id.
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legislation allowing sports wagering. 61 Specifically, Congress allowed
Delaware, Montana, Oregon, and Nevada to retain their respective
legislation that had already legalized a form of sports wagering. 62
Additionally, Congress carved out a special exception for New
Jersey, 63 allowing it to authorize sports wagering within one year of
PASPA’s enactment. 64 New Jersey was granted this exception to
provide its voters the opportunity to decide if they wanted to legalize
sports wagering in Atlantic City casinos. 65 However, the exception
provided that if New Jersey did not pass a statute authorizing sports
wagering within that one-year period, sports wagering in New Jersey
would be completely prohibited. 66 New Jersey did not seize the
opportunity to pass its own statute, and thus the window to legally
enact sports wagering in New Jersey closed. 67
During the pre-enactment hearings, PASPA did not go
unchallenged. Iowa Senator Chuck Grassley and the DOJ were the
biggest opponents of PASPA, 68 arguing that the legislation: 1)
promoted discrimination among the States via the “grandfather”
clause; 2) lacked justification; and 3) fundamentally restricted the right
of States to raise revenue to fund critical State programs.69
Specifically, for the first point, they alleged that PASPA’s grandfather
provision discriminated against forty-six of the fifty States by allowing
only Delaware, Montana, Oregon, and Nevada to continue to legally
operate sports wagering, thus creating a monopoly on the industry. 70
61

28 U.S.C.A. § 3704(a) (1992).
Id.
63 Atlantic City, New Jersey was the only location that could meet the exception provided
in 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704(a)(3). See Christopher L. Soriano, The Efforts to Legalize Sports Betting
(Apr.
2013),
in
New
Jersey:
A
History,
N.J. LAWYER MAGAZINE
http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/soriano_njlawyer_0413.pdf.
64 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704(a)(3) (1992).
65 138 Cong. Rec. H11756-02, H11757 (1992). New Jersey was provided this special
exception based on its extensive role in the gaming industry.
66 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704(a)(3) (1992).
67 The New Jersey Senate supported a referendum to amend the state constitution to permit
the Legislature to authorize sports betting, but strong opposition by New Jersey Senator Bill
Bradley, PASPA’s sponsor, resulted in the vote never taking place and New Jersey’s grace
period expired, Soriano. Supra note 63; Joseph F. Sullivan, Gambling Debate Rages Anew
TIMES
(Nov.
20,
1991),
Over
Sports,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/20/nyregion/gambling-debate-rages-anew-oversports.html.
68 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 12 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3562.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 12-13. The Senate hearing did not refer to Montana as an exempt state because
Montana passed its law pertaining to sports wagering after this hearing.
62
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For the second point, they argued that the legislation was without merit
because the grandfather clause defeated the very intent and purpose
behind enacting PASPA. 71 Although PASPA was enacted to prohibit
sports wagering because it was seen as “evil” and a threat to America’s
youth and to the integrity of sporting events, the legislation did not ban
sports wagering in all States but instead merely limited its
applicability. 72 For the third point, the DOJ noted that determinations
of how to raise revenue have typically been left to the States. 73 The
DOJ was concerned with federalism issues if PASPA was read as
anything beyond a clarification of current federal law. 74 This point led
to the recent litigation challenging the constitutionality of PASPA.
III.

LEGALITY OF NEW JERSEY’S LAWS UNDER PASPA AND
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PASPA

Facing a substantial decline in casino and racetrack revenue,
the New Jersey legislature held public hearings in 2010 to determine
whether it should amend its Constitution to legalize sports wagering. 75
The New Jersey Senate State Government, Wagering, Tourism, &
Historic Preservation Committee then approved the amendment by a
vote of 4-0, with one abstention. 76 Following another public hearing,
the New Jersey Legislature approved the amendment by a
supermajority, 77 and an official ballot was conducted among New
Jersey citizens in which 64% voted in favor of the amendment. 78 In
2011, as a result of this resounding support, the New Jersey
Constitution was amended to allow the Legislature to “authorize by
71

Id. at 13-16.
28 U.S.C.A. § 3704 (1992).
73 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 13.
74 Id.
75 Brief for Appellants Christopher J. Christie, David L. Rebuck, and Frank Zanzuccki at 1,
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey (No. 13-1715), 2013 WL 1873966,
at *1; Public Hearing on N.J. Sports Betting Set for Atlantic City, GAMBLING911 (Mar. 31,
2010), http://www.gambling911.com/gambling-news/public-hearing-nj-sports-betting-setatlantic-city-033110.html.
76 Public Hearing on N.J. Sports Betting Set for Atlantic City, supra note 75.
77 New Jersey Sports Betting Amendment, Public Question 1 (2011), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/New_Jersey_Sports_Betting_Amendment,_Public_Question_1_(2011
) (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
78 New Jersey County Vote Results for Sports Betting Amendment, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov.
9,
2011),
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/files/elections/2011/by_county/NJ_Page_1108.html?SITE=AP
&SECTION=POLITICS.
72
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law wagering . . . on the results of any professional, college, or
amateur sport or athletic event” 79 but the constitutional provision was
narrowly tailored to allow sports wagering only at Atlantic City’s
casinos and sports gambling houses, and at racetracks within the State
of New Jersey. 80
Thereafter, in 2012, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the
“Sports Wagering Law” pursuant to the new provision in New Jersey’s
Constitution.81 This law provided the New Jersey Legislature with the
authority to only license sports gambling and sports pools in Atlantic
City’s casinos and racetracks within New Jersey. 82 Sports wagering
remained prohibited in New Jersey except to the extent that a casino or
racetrack was authorized by the State. 83 Additionally, New Jersey
passed substantive regulations to actively and closely monitor all
organizations that were approved for sports wagering under this law. 84
A. 2012 Law: New Jersey District Court
In August 2012, the National Basketball Association (“NBA”),
Major League Baseball, the National Collegiate Athletic Association,
the National Football League (“NFL”), and the National Hockey
League (“NHL”) (collectively “the Leagues”) exercised their right
under PASPA and sued New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, New
Jersey’s Racing Commissioner, and New Jersey’s Director of Gaming
Enforcement (collectively, “New Jersey”) in the U.S. District Court of
the District of New Jersey. 85 Specifically, they requested an
injunction, alleging that New Jersey’s new statute violated PASPA. 86

79

N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2(D), (F); Brief for Appellants Christopher J. Christie, David
L. Rebuck, and Frank Zanzuccki at 13, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New
Jersey (No. 13-1715), 2013 WL 1873966, at *13.
80 N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2(D), (F). There are some exceptions. No wager can be placed
on college games or athletic events that take place in New Jersey or on any game in which a
New Jersey college team participates. Wagering is limited to individuals who are 21 years or
older. Id.
81 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A–1 to 5:12A-6 (2012), invalidated by Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See generally N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:69N (2012).
85 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553 (D.N.J.), aff’d sub
nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
86 Id.
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Although the DOJ had initially opposed PASPA, 87 as the first
case challenging PASPA’s constitutionality, the DOJ intervened as a
plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2403 in January 2013. 88 The Plaintiffs
then moved for summary judgment, advancing their position that
PASPA is a “permissible exercise of Congress’s power pursuant to the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.” 89 They
argued that Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate wagering because wagering is an activity that has a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 90 As a result, they reasoned that New
Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law should be struck down as a violation of
PASPA. 91 In opposition, New Jersey argued that PASPA was
unconstitutional. 92 Specifically, it argued that PASPA violated: 1) the
Commerce Clause and 2) the Tenth Amendment’s limitations on
Congress’s powers. 93
The district court ultimately concluded that PASPA was a
proper exercise of Congress’s commerce power because “Congress
had a rational basis to conclude that legalized sports betting would
impact interstate commerce.” 94 Furthermore, the court concluded that
PASPA did not violate the Tenth Amendment because it did not force
the States to engage in affirmative activity. 95 Specifically, the court
stated that “[n]o action on the part of the States is required in order for
PASPA to achieve its ends.” 96 Therefore, the court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and permanently enjoined New
Jersey from enacting the Sports Wagering Law. 97 New Jersey
subsequently appealed. 98

87

See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 553-54.
89 Id. at 558.
90 Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Christie (No. 12-cv-04947), 2012 WL 3964728 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012).
91 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 554.
92 Id. at 557.
93 Id. New Jersey also argued that PASPA violated the Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause. The court concluded Congress had a rational basis to enact PASPA, and
as such ruled against New Jersey’s Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause claims.
Id. at 576.
94 Id. at 560.
95 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 570-72.
96 Id. at 572 (emphasis omitted).
97 Id. at 579.
98 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 217 (3d Cir.
2013).
88
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B. Christie I
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
what is referred to as Christie I, affirmed the lower court’s decision. 99
Here, New Jersey did not challenge Congress’s ability to directly
regulate sports wagering under the Commerce Clause but instead
argued that “PASPA’s operation over the Sports Wagering Law
violate[d] the anti-commandeering principle” because it prevented
States from repealing an existing law. 100
The Christie I court began by analyzing the Commerce Clause,
which grants Congress the ability to “regulate an activity that
‘substantially affects interstate commerce’ if it ‘arise[s] out of or [is]
connected with a commercial transaction.’” 101 The court first
determined that wagering—the “engaging in a game for money,
property, checks, or any representative of value” 102—and national
sports operated by for-profit leagues 103 are economic activities. 104
Next, the court reasoned that professional and amateur sports events
substantially affect interstate commerce because thousands of sports
teams and clubs operate across the U.S. 105 Because wagering follows
sporting events, wagering also substantially affects interstate
commerce. 106 Therefore, as PASPA seeks to limit both wagering and
its effect on national sports, the court concluded that these are
“quintessentially economic” activities that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, and thus Congress had a rational basis for
determining that sports wagering affects interstate commerce. 107
In addressing the constitutionality of PASPA under the anticommandeering doctrine, the court in Christie I held that PASPA was
constitutional because it merely prohibits “the issuance of gambling
licenses or the affirmative authorization by law of gambling
schemes” 108 and, as such, does not commandeer the States at all. 109
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id. at 241.
Id. at 227, 232.
Id. at 224 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995)).
Id. at 225 (internal citation omitted).
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 225.
Id. at 224-25.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 232 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
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Specifically, the court reasoned that when “Congress passes a law that
operates via the Supremacy Clause to invalidate contrary state laws, it
is not telling the [S]tates what to do, it is barring them from something
they want to do.” 110 Rather than affirmatively requiring or coercing
the States to pass laws prohibiting sports wagering, Congress merely
invalidated state laws that were contrary to PASPA. 111
To distinguish PASPA from the laws struck down in New
York112 and Printz, 113 the court relied, in part, on Reno v. Condon,
which, as stated above, 114 upheld the DPPA because it did not require
the States to enact laws or regulations or control the manner in which
States regulate private citizens. 115 The court also relied on the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Kelley v. United States, 116 which upheld the
constitutionality of an intrastate motor carrier statute because it only
preempted state law and “did not ‘compel[] the [S]tates to . . . enact[]
or administer[] a federal regulatory program.’” 117 Additionally, the
court relied on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California’s decision in California Dump Truck Owners Ass’n v.
Davis, 118 which upheld the constitutionality of a Federal Aviation
Administration Authorization Act provision because it told the States
what not to do and thus did not command the States to affirmatively
act. 119 Based on these three cases, the court in Christie I held that
PASPA did not commandeer New Jersey’s legislative process because
“[a]ll that is prohibited is the issuance of gambling ‘license[s]’ or the
affirmative ‘authoriz[ation] by law’ of gambling schemes.” 120 The
court noted that there is a stark difference between having no law in
place to govern sports wagering and enacting a law that authorizes
sports wagering. 121 If there was no difference between the two,
PASPA could be construed as commandeering a State’s legislature by

110

Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
112 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
113 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
114 See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
115 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 228-29.
116 69 F.3d 1503 (10th Cir. 1995).
117 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 230 (quoting Kelley, 69 F.3d at 1510).
118 172 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (challenging the applicability of a safety
regulation exception in the FAAA Act as it applied to local municipalities).
119 Id. at 1304.
120 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 232.
121 Id.
111
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forcing it to enact a law prohibiting sports wagering. 122 As a result, the
court rejected New Jersey’s arguments that PASPA was
unconstitutional for violating the anti-commandeering doctrine under
the Tenth Amendment. 123
Additionally, the court disagreed with New Jersey’s argument
that a repeal of New Jersey’s previous prohibition on sports wagering
would equate to authorizing the activity. 124 The court stated that
PASPA allows States to repeal laws prohibiting sports in their entirety
because “having no law in place governing sports wagering is [not] the
same as authorizing it by law” 125 and the “lack of an affirmative
prohibition . . . does not mean [the activity] is affirmatively authorized
by law.” 126 Therefore, PASPA leaves the States with two choices: 1)
repeal their sports wagering ban; or 2) keep a complete ban on sports
wagering. 127 In reaching this decision, the court in Christie I stated
that “it is left up to each [S]tate to decide how much of a law
enforcement priority it wants to make of sports gambling, or what the
exact contours of the prohibition will be.” 128 New Jersey then appealed
to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. 129
C. 2014 Law: District Court and Christie II
In response to Christie I, New Jersey enacted a law in 2014 that
repealed all sports wagering regulations, penalties, and prohibitions as
applied to casinos and racetracks. 130 This law, like the 2012 Sports
Wagering Law, was designed to allow sports wagering at casinos and
racetracks. While the 2012 law permitted New Jersey to regulate and
authorize which casinos and racetracks were permitted to offer sports
wagering, the 2014 law removed all government involvement at these
locations and placed a ban on all sports wagering except as applied to

122

Id.
Id.
124 Id.
125 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 232.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 233.
128 Id.
129 Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
130 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-7 (2014) (repealed N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A–1 to 5:12A–6),
invalidated by Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 392
(3d Cir. 2016).
123
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casinos or racetracks. 131 In other words, the 2014 law affirmatively
prohibited sports wagering at all locations and businesses except at
casinos and racetracks. 132 New Jersey relied on Christie I’s holding
that the “lack of an affirmative prohibition of an activity does not mean
it is affirmatively authorized by law” 133 and thus believed this 2014
partial repeal law was not in violation of PASPA because it did not
explicitly authorize sports gambling at casinos and racetracks. 134 The
Leagues challenged this partial repeal by filing suit against New Jersey
again in district court. 135 The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the Leagues and issued a permanent injunction against New
Jersey after concluding that the 2014 partial repeal was preempted by
PASPA. 136 The district court interpreted Christie I as holding that
PASPA offers only two choices: 1) maintain prohibitions on sports
wagering; or 2) completely repeal the prohibitions. 137 It thereby held
that a partial repeal results in state-sanctioned sports wagering in
violation of PASPA.138
New Jersey subsequently appealed to the Third Circuit, arguing
that its partial repeal was specifically permitted by Christie I. 139 New
Jersey pointed out that Christie I reasoned that “the lack of an
affirmative prohibition of an activity does not mean it is affirmatively
authorized by law.” 140 Because the 2014 repeal did not explicitly
authorize sports wagering at casinos and racetracks but instead simply
removed the regulations governing these locations, New Jersey alleged
that this law was not an affirmative authorization of sports wagering
131

Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, sports wagering was prohibited by anyone under 21
years old, on games played in New Jersey, or in which a New Jersey team participates. Id.
132 Id.
133 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 232 (3d Cir.
2013).
134 § 5:12A-7.
135 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 490-91 (D.N.J. 2014),
aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 799 F.3d 259 (3d
Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Oct. 14, 2015), on reh’g en banc, 832
F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), and aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of
New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016).
136 Id. at 508.
137 Id. at 501 (emphasis added).
138 Id. at 505.
139 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 799 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir.
2015), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Oct. 14, 2015), on reh’g en banc, 832 F.3d
389 (3d Cir. 2016).
140 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 232 (3d Cir.
2013).
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as prohibited under PASPA. 141 The Third Circuit (“Christie II”)
affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that the 2014 partial repeal
violated PASPA because it authorized sports gambling. 142 New Jersey
requested a hearing en banc, which was granted. 143
D. Christie III
In October 2015, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated
Christie II’s decision 144 and, in a 9-3 ruling, (“Christie III”) held that
the partial repeal violated PASPA and PASPA did not violate the
Tenth Amendment. 145 The majority explicitly rejected Christie I’s
reasoning that a repeal cannot constitute an authorization. 146 It further
concluded that “a [S]tate’s decision to selectively remove a prohibition
on sports wagering in a manner that permissively channels wagering
activity to particular locations or operators is, in essence,
‘authorization’ under PASPA.” 147 The court reasoned that New
Jersey’s 2014 partial repeal, which removed the prohibition only at
casinos and racetracks, was in fact an authorization of sports wagering
at these locations. 148 Additionally, the court rejected what it
considered dicta from Christie I’s decision pertaining to a State’s
options under PASPA. 149 In doing so, Christie III refused to identify
the specific options left to the States under PASPA except to suggest
that a complete repeal or a partial repeal allowing friends and families
to make de minimis wagers between themselves may be allowed. 150

141

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 799 F.3d at 266.
Id. at 268.
143 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 392 (3d Cir.
2016); The Third Circuit only granted one hearing en banc out of 2,402 appeals, or in other
words .04% of the time. U.S. Courts of Appeals—Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral
Arguments or Submission on Briefs, by Circuit, During the 12-Month Period Ending
COURTS,
September
30,
2014,
U.S.
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/B10Sep14.pdf (last visited
Mar. 31, 2017).
144 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 392.
145 Id. at 390.
146 Id. at 396-97.
147 Id. at 401.
148 Id. at 397.
149 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 397. Christie I stated a State has two options:
repeal its sports wagering ban or maintain a complete prohibition. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 233 (3d Cir. 2013).
150 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 401-02.
142
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Christie III rejected New Jersey’s Tenth Amendment
argument, although for different reasons than articulated in Christie I.
Specifically, the court in Christie I held that PASPA was constitutional
because it does not require the States to keep any laws in place, 151 while
the court in Christie III held that PASPA was constitutional because:
1) it does not present the States with a coercive choice and 2) it does
not require the States to take any action. 152 The court in Christie III
held that the States are not presented with a coercive choice because
the States are “afforded sufficient room under PASPA to craft their
own policies” 153 and are “not required to pass laws, to take title to
anything, to conduct background checks, to expend any funds, or to in
any way enforce federal law.” 154 Additionally, PASPA does not
require States to take any action because “PASPA does not command
[S]tates take any affirmative steps.” 155 As such, the court upheld
PASPA’s constitutionality and ruled that the 2014 law violated
PASPA. 156 Therefore, Christie III affirmed the district court’s decision
granting a permanent injunction. 157
Judge Fuentes, joined by Judge Restrepo, dissented from the
majority’s holding that New Jersey’s partial repeal is an authorization
of sports wagering. 158 Judge Fuentes stated that PASPA prohibits the
States from sponsoring, operating, advertising, promoting, licensing,
or authorizing sports wagering by law or compact. 159 As such, he
stated that “authorization by law . . . cannot merely be inferred, . . . [it]
requires a specific legislative enactment that affirmatively allows
[citizens] of th[at] [S]tate to bet on sports.”160 Therefore, the dissent
contended that the 2014 repeal did not explicitly or implicitly authorize
sports wagering because it did not affirmatively allow sports
wagering. 161 Rather, New Jersey’s 2014 law merely left casinos and
racetracks in a state of limbo—they were unregulated because sports
151

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 237.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 402.
153 Id. at 401.
154 Id. at 402 (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 730 F.3d at 231).
155 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 402.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 403 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
160 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 403 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
161 Id. (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
152
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wagering prohibitions were not applicable to them. 162 Furthermore,
pursuant to this partial repeal, New Jersey could not, and did not
propose to, perform any actions prohibited by PASPA such as
sponsoring, operating, advertising, promoting, licensing, or
authorizing by law sports wagering. 163 Because having no law in place
at several locations did not equate to New Jersey’s authorizing sports
wagering, Judge Fuentes argued that the partial repeal did not violate
PASPA. 164 Judge Fuentes interestingly posed the following
hypothetical scenario:
Suppose the State did exactly what the majority
suggests it could have done: repeal completely its sports
betting prohibitions. In that circumstance, sports
betting could occur anywhere in the State and there
would be no restrictions as to age, location, or whether
a bettor could wager on games involving local teams.
Would the State violate PASPA if it later enacted
limited restrictions regarding age requirements and
places where wagering could occur? Surely no
conceivable reading of PASPA would preclude a
[S]tate from restricting sports wagering in this
scenario. Yet the 2014 Repeal comes to the same
result. 165
In essence, Judge Fuentes argued that if a State issued a
complete repeal allowing sports wagering to be conducted anywhere
in the State, as the majority inferred is permissible, 166 that State would
not violate PASPA by enacting a law to restrict the age of bettors.167
He further argued that because New Jersey’s 2014 law achieves the
same outcome, it too did not violate PASPA. 168
Judge Vanaskie separately dissented based on the Tenth
Amendment, which, in his view, prohibits PASPA from compelling
the States to govern private sports wagering activity. 169 He criticized
the majority for “dodg[ing] the inevitable conclusion that PASPA
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

Id. at 405 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 406 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 405 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 405 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 405 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
Id. (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 411 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting).
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conscripts the States to prohibit wagering on sports by suggesting that
some partial repeal of the ban on sports gambling would not be
tantamount to authorization of gambling.” 170 Furthermore, he argued
that PASPA controls “the manner in which States regulate private
parties” because the States’ agendas are disregarded and the States
must regulate their citizens according to Congress’s instruction.171
Judge Vanaskie viewed Christie III as leaving the State without a
choice. 172 Specifically, while Christie I’s decision gave the States an
option to repeal, “in whole or in part, existing bans” on sports
wagering, Judge Vanaskie criticized the majority’s holding in Christie
III for leaving the States without a choice because a repeal—whether
in whole or in part—is implicit authorization.173
Overall, the dissenters argued that, under the majority opinion,
every state law–except one that completely repeals all sports wagering
prohibitions–will likely violate PASPA. 174 However, in the view of
this author, the majority in Christie III correctly determined that the
2014 sports wagering law violates PASPA because it effectively
permitted gambling at specified locations, albeit subject to certain
restrictions. 175 The majority was correct in reaching this result even
though the 2014 law on its face did not explicitly authorize sports
wagering activity. 176 The law clearly had an equivalent effect.
Nonetheless, as explained in Part IV below, the dissent correctly
concluded that PASPA violates the Tenth Amendment.
E. Supreme Court Consideration
New Jersey’s petition for certiorari is currently pending before
the U.S. Supreme Court. 177 On January 17, 2017, the Supreme Court
170

Id. at 406 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting).
Id. at 410 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
172 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 411 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting).
173 Id. (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
174 Id. at 405-06, 411 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (Vanaskie, J., dissenting); See supra note 150
and accompanying text.
175 Sports wagering was prohibited for anyone under 21 years old, on games played in New
Jersey, or in which a New Jersey team participates. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-7 (2014).
176 As Judge Fuentes argued, New Jersey’s 2014 law, on its face, did not authorize the sports
wagering because the statute did not affirmatively authorize casinos and racetracks to engage
in sports wagering activities. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 403 (Fuentes, J.,
dissenting).
177 Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass ‘n, No. 16-476, 2017 WL 160450, at *1 (U.S.
Jan. 17, 2017).
171
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invited the acting U.S. Solicitor General to file a brief “expressing the
views of the United States.” 178 Although the Supreme Court did not
officially grant a writ of certiorari, its request for the Solicitor
General’s opinion was a positive sign for New Jersey on a day when
the Court denied over 130 appeal petitions. 179 The Court’s request for
the Solicitor General’s viewpoint is significant because the Solicitor
General’s interpretation of the federal statute or request to grant the
petition will likely have a significant impact on the Court’s decision.180
Additionally, the eight justices at the time 181 would not have requested
the federal government’s opinion if they did not believe the case was
significant. The Solicitor General has not provided an early indication
of his view on this case; however, considering President Trump is in
favor of legalizing sports wagering, there may be reason to think that
the opinion of the Solicitor General will lean in New Jersey’s favor.
The confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court may
also tilt the scales in favor of New Jersey as Justice Gorsuch has taken
a strict textualist interpretation of the Constitution 182 and seems to
favor State power over federal power. 183 Although the Solicitor
178

Id.; The Solicitor General appears before the Supreme Court on behalf of the United
States. At the time of the Supreme Court’s invitation Ian Health Gershengorn was the acting
U.S. Solicitor General. Noel Francisco became acting U.S. Solicitor General on January 23,
2017. See Robert Barnes, Trump Nominates D.C. Lawyer Noel Francisco as Solicitor, THE
WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/trumpnominates-dc-lawyer-noel-francisco-as-solicitor-general/2017/03/08/c62b0774-040f-11e7b9fa-ed727b644a0b_story.html?utm_term=.7961bfd0b100.
179 Orders
in Pending Cases, U.S. SUPREME COURT (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/011717zor_5h26.pdf.
180 John Brennan, Two Attorneys Explain Significance of U.S. Supreme Court Notice on NJ
JERSEY
(Jan.
17,
2017),
Sports
Betting,
N.
http://www.northjersey.com/story/news/business/meadowlandsmatters/2017/01/17/supreme-court-nj-sports-betting/96661138/.
181 At the time of the Supreme Court’s decision, Justice Neil Gorsuch had not yet been
confirmed as a justice of the Supreme Court.
182 See, e.g., U.S. v. Law, 572 F. App’x 644, 648 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J., concurring);
U.S. v. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d 1136, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). As
a strict texualist, Justice Gorsuch may conclude with Judge Fuentes of the Third Circuit that
New Jersey’s 2014 law did not violate PASPA by authorizing sports wagering because it did
not affirmatively allow sports wagering. See supra note 176.
183 Justice Gorsuch has disagreed with the use of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine,
which is used to limit a State’s power to regulate interstate commerce when Congress has not
acted under the Commerce Clause. Justice Gorsuch has indicated his agreement with Justices
Scalia and Thomas that the doctrine is “absent from the Constitution’s text and incompatible
with its structure.” Energy and Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015);
Kevin Simpson, Neil Gorsuch: Elite Credentials, Conservative Western Roots Land Denver
POST
(Dec.
11,
2016),
Native
on
SCOTUS
List,
DENVER
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/12/11/neil-gorsuch-trump-scotus-list/;
Eric
Citron,
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General has no deadline to submit a brief, the Solicitor General’s usual
practice is to file its briefs by May, which, if the petition is granted,
would result in the Supreme Court hearing oral arguments during its
2018 term. 184
IV.

ANTI-COMMANDEERING DOCTRINE

The anti-commandeering doctrine under the Tenth
Amendment provides that Congress does not have the power to either
commandeer State or local government officials to carry out a federal
program or compel the States to legislate in a certain way. 185 PASPA
runs afoul of this anti-commandeering principle because Congress is
burdening the States with the responsibility to prohibit sports
wagering. If Congress wants to prohibit sports wagering, it should do
so directly and not use the States to carry out its will.
Historically, States have regulated sports wagering pursuant to
their police power. 186 That is to say, States have been able to
implement their own regulations in the field of gambling subject to
overarching federal laws. However, PASPA removes this power from
the States without preempting the field. 187 Pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause, Congress can choose to preempt the field of sports wagering
by regulating the field itself. 188 But that is not what Congress did.
Instead, PASPA put the onus on the States. In doing so, it created the
same accountability problems that the Court identified in Printz.189

Potential Nominee Profile: Neil Gorsuch, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 13, 2017),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/potential-nominee-profile-neil-gorsuch/.
184 Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last
visited Apr. 4, 2017); Steve Silver, The Supreme Court Just Asked the Trump Administration
to Weigh in on Legal Sports Betting in New Jersey, VICE SPORTS (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://sports.vice.com/en_us/highlight/the-supreme-court-just-asked-the-trumpadministration-to-weigh-in-on-legal-sports-betting-in-new-jersey.
185 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
186 Helton v. Hunt, 330 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2003).
187 When Congress preempts an area of law, the federal law must be applied over any
conflicting or absent state law in this area. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 372-73 (2000).
188 See New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
189 See supra notes 40-44. In Printz, the Brady Act raised accountability concerns because
it required state and local authorities to conduct a background check on gun owners pursuant
to Congress’s instructions. Any complaints by a State’s citizens would fall on the State and
not on Congress, even though the States were solely acting according to Congress’s
instructions.
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PASPA raises accountability concerns because State citizens are likely
to blame the State when it acts to prohibit sports wagering even though
it is merely doing the bidding of Congress. If Congress wants to
prohibit sports wagering, Congress should do so itself and bear the
political repercussions.
As the Court held in New York,
“[a]ccountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion,
elected [S]tate officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views
of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal
regulation.” 190 As PASPA requires the States to govern according to
Congress’s instructions, without preempting the field or itself acting,
PASPA violates the principle of federalism under the Tenth
Amendment.
Realistically, either a State’s partial or complete repeal of its
sports prohibition violates PASPA. While New Jersey was not
allowed to enact a regulatory scheme permitting sports wagering (e.g.,
2012 law) 191 or to partially repeal that law in a way that implicitly
authorized sports wagering in Atlantic City (e.g., 2014 law), 192 the
Third Circuit suggested that a different sort of partial repeal–one that
allowed friends and family to make de minimis bets–would be allowed
because it would not have the “type of authorizing effect” as the 2014
law. 193 The court refused to specify what other types of partial repeals
would be authorized under PASPA 194 and provided no guidance or
explanation as to why authorizing bets among friends and family
would be permissible under PASPA while authorizing some gambling
at casinos and racetracks was prohibited. 195 The court’s comments
suggest that the allowable “authorizing effect” of de minimis bets may
refer to the relatively low value of wagers placed and the informal
manner of how wagers are placed, but the court failed to provide any
definitive explanation. 196 In this author’s view, there is no basis to
distinguish de minimis bets from the wagering implicitly authorized
pursuant to New Jersey’s 2014 law because both types of repeals
would be geared towards private citizens, and PASPA, in any event,
carves out no exception based on the amount wagered, who places the
190

New York, 505 U.S. at 169.
See supra Part III, Section B.
192 See supra Part III, Section D.
193 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 402 (3d Cir.
2016).
194 Id.
195 See id.
196 Id. at 401-02.
191
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bet, or the “authorizing effect.” 197 Instead, PASPA ensures that a
private citizen violates state law rather than federal law, even if the
State does not want a governing sports wagering prohibition.
Although the majority suggested a complete repeal of a State’s
prohibitions on sports wagering is permissible, 198 this statement is
difficult to reconcile with the court’s conclusion that a partial repeal is
an implicit authorization. 199
Specifically, a complete repeal
undermines and is contrary to the goals of PASPA because a State that
does not prohibit sports wagering by law implicitly allows individuals
and private entities to conduct sports wagering. The Third Circuit’s
decision turned on the effect of the law and not “on the way in which
the [S]tate has enacted its directive.” 200 A complete repeal operates
the same as a partial repeal (e.g., the 2014 law) because even though a
complete repeal would lift sports wagering prohibitions for the entire
state and a partial repeal would lift sports wagering prohibitions only
in certain areas, the effect of both is to allow sports wagering, which,
in any event, is prohibited by PASPA. In other words, allowing sports
wagering, in any way, is prohibited, no matter the scale. Thus, any
repeal–be it partial or complete–of a sports wagering prohibition
violates PASPA.
Thus, New Jersey is left with a single choice: maintain a
complete prohibition. The Supreme Court has previously held in New
York201 that forcing the States to legislate in a prescribed way violates
the Tenth Amendment. 202 In that case, the Court struck down the
federal statute that required States to either provide for radioactive
waste disposal or take title to waste made within the State’s borders as
a violation of the Tenth Amendment. 203 The Court reasoned that
“[w]here a federal interest is sufficiently strong to cause Congress to
legislate, it must do so directly; it may not conscript [S]tate
governments as its agents.” 204 Therefore, when a State is offered a
choice between two unconstitutional coercive choices, the State is left

197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 3702, 3704 (1992).
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 401-02.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 397.
See supra notes 35-38.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 146 (1992).
Id.
Id. at 178.
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with no choice at all. 205 PASPA governs an activity that Congress
wants to prohibit but gives the States the full burden of enforcing its
prohibition. To comply with PASPA, States must leave their
prohibitions governing sports wagering in effect or potentially forego
any regulation at all. Congress, in effect, hijacks New Jersey’s
Legislature by prohibiting it from partially or completely repealing its
sports wagering prohibition and forcing it to keep its prohibitions in
place. As such, Congress coercively forces the States to act as
Congress’s agents in violation of the Tenth Amendment principles.
In contrast, the Supreme Court has upheld federal acts where
Congress provides States with a choice to either implement a law
consistent with federal standards or abandon the field entirely, thereby
allowing Congress to directly regulate the activity. In Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc. 206 the Court upheld
the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, which
imposed federal environmental protection standards for coal mining. 207
The Court held the Act constitutional because it provided the States
with a choice to either follow the Act and adopt a coal mining plan
according to federal standards or allow the “full regulatory burden [to]
be borne by the Federal Government.” 208 The Act did not force the
States to enact a law but instead created federal regulations within the
coal mining industry, a preempted field, which the States had a choice
to adopt or not adopt.
Additionally, the Supreme Court upheld the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”), a federal act, in F.E.R.C. v.
Mississippi 209 because the States had a choice between “abandoning
regulation of the [energy] field altogether or considering the federal
standards.” 210 PURPA allowed the States’ continued regulation in the
energy field on the condition that they consider federal standards and
did not compel the States to enact a legislative program. 211 Similar to
Hodel, the Court noted that Congress could have instead preempted the
field of energy regulation. 212
205 Id. at 146 (providing that States must take title to the waste or regulate pursuant to
Congress’s direction).
206 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
207 Id. at 305.
208 Id. at 288.
209 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
210 Id. at 766.
211 Id. at 765.
212 Id. at 764-65.
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The federal acts in both Hodel and F.E.R.C. differ from PASPA
because the States, under PASPA, do not have a choice to implement
their own laws consistent with federal standards. Instead, States are
directed by the federal government to not authorize or license sports
gambling in any way. If a State decides that it no longer wants to
regulate sports wagering, and it repeals its statute or regulations, that
State violates PASPA because such a repeal is analogous to an
authorization of sports wagering. 213 Although a State is theoretically
allowed to issue a complete repeal, as noted earlier, doing so would
implicitly allow sports wagering to be conducted by any individual
within the State. 214 Akin to a partial repeal, a complete repeal would
frustrate the central purpose of PASPA. As such, a complete repeal
would likely be struck down by the courts as analogous to an
authorization of sports wagering.
In rejecting the Tenth Amendment argument, the Third Circuit
repeatedly relied on Reno v. Condon, 215 in which the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the DPPA. 216 However, PASPA is
distinguishable from the DPPA. The DPPA was held constitutional
because it “[d]id not require (1) ‘the States in their sovereign capacity
to regulate their own citizens,’ (2) ‘the . . . Legislature to enact any
laws or regulations,’ or (3) ‘state officials to assist in the enforcement
of federal statutes regulating private individuals.’” 217 However, unlike
the DPPA, PASPA requires States to regulate in their sovereign
capacity because PASPA prohibits private activity pursuant to state
law by directing how States must govern their citizens. Through
PASPA, States are acting on behalf of Congress, thus violating the first
and third principles listed above. In addition, PASPA violates the
second principle because although the court held that PASPA does not
require States to pass new laws, it does prevent the States from
repealing existing laws, which is equivalent to forcing the States to

213 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 397 (3d Cir.
2016).
214 See supra text accompanying notes 191-205.
215 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
216 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 832 F.3d 389, 400-02
(3d Cir. 2016); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d
208, 228-31, 234-37 (3d Cir. 2013).
217 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 410 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (quoting Reno,
528 U.S. at 151).
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pass legislation. 218 Therefore, PASPA is distinguishable from the
DPPA with regard to the three principles the Court enunciated and as
such violates the Tenth Amendment.
Furthermore, because the federal government regulates sports
wagering via state law by compelling the States to conform to PASPA,
PASPA ensures that sports wagering violates state law, not federal law.
While it is well established that the federal government cannot “seek
to control or influence the manner in which States regulate private
parties,” 219 the federal government could offer States the choice to
regulate the private activity according to federal standards or preempt
state law entirely. 220 However, Congress has failed to do either here.
Because States cannot abandon their regulation of sports
wagering, as doing so could be seen as authorizing the activity under
PASPA, they are forced to do the bidding of Congress. While the
Third Circuit, in dicta, indicated that not all repeals would amount to
an authorization it failed to provide any meaningful guidance. 221 Even
though Christie III stated there is an area between a repeal and
authorization that may be valid, the Third Circuit’s decisions show that
it is unlikely one can ever be found because any removal of a
prohibition constitutes government authorization.
Ultimately, by preventing States from repealing existing laws,
the court essentially forced States to regulate activities that they may
desire to leave unregulated. Christie III refused to equate preventing
States from repealing laws with forcing a State to legislate, which
would run afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering
principles. But, as the dissenting justices found, the decision should
be seen as forcing New Jersey to govern according to Congress’s
instructions regarding sports wagering. Viewed that way, PASPA
violates State sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment.

218

Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring)
(“[P]reventing the [S]tate from repealing an existing law is no different from forcing it to pass
a new one; in either case, the [S]tate is being forced to regulate conduct that it prefers to leave
unregulated.”).
219 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 514 (1988).
220 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992); F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 764-65 (1982).
221 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 832 F.3d at 401-02.
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V. SPORTS WAGERING SHOULD BE LEGAL THROUGHOUT THE U.S.
A.

Public Policy – PASPA No Longer Has a Place in
the U.S.

For several decades, many amateur and professional sports
leagues opposed sports wagering on their games. 222 However, in
recent years, league commissioners, team owners, the casino gambling
industry, the American Gaming Association, the U.S. Conference of
Mayors, and the National Council of State Legislatures have been
much more open to the possibility of legalized sports wagering. 223
President Trump appears to share this sentiment, as he stated in 2015
that he is comfortable with the idea of sports wagering due to its
already existing prominence in the black market. 224 In February 2017,
he advised that he wanted the input of the league commissioners, law
enforcement officials, and other organizations before he would push
for legalization legislation in Congress. 225 It is likely that as public
opinion becomes more supportive of legalized sports wagering,
PASPA may be amended or repealed entirely.
The fear of games being fixed or tainted because of gambling—
one purpose for passing PASPA—has lost its force. In a 2016 study
about the Super Bowl, a majority of respondents wanted Congress to
change America’s current sports wagering laws because they believed
that “regulat[ing] sports wagering would protect a game’s integrity,
benefit communities and enhance consumer safety, and increase fan

222 See Will Hobson, Sports Gambling in U.S.: Too Prevalent to Remain Illegal?, THE
WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/sports-gambling-in-ustoo-prevalent-to-remain-illegal/2015/02/27/f1088e4c-b7d3-11e4-9423f3d0a1ec335c_story.html?utm_term=.820a488f551e.
223 Max Willens, MLB Commisioner Changes Gambling Stance: Federal System A ‘Pretty
Good Idea’, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/mlb-commisionerchanges-gambling-stance-federal-system-pretty-good-idea-1833046; Tony Batt, NHL Rolls
the Dice on Las Vegas, GAMBLING COMPLIANCE (June 23, 2016), http://www.beckerpoliakoff.com/webfiles/pdf/Wallach/gamblingcompliance_vegas_hockey_2016-06-23.pdf.;
Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 2.
224 Highlights From Donald Trump’s Interview on The Herd With Colin Cowherd, FOX
SPORTS
(Nov.
2,
2015),
http://www.foxsports.com/presspass/latestnews/2015/11/02/presidential-candidate-donaldtrump-on-the-herd; Press Release, White House, Radio Interview of President Trump by Jim
Gray, Westwood One Sports Radio (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2017/02/05/radio-interview-president-trump-jim-gray-westwood-one-sports-radio.
225 Fox Sports, supra note 224; White House, supra note 224.
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engagement.” 226 As for sports leagues, the NHL recently approved a
new team based in Las Vegas that will begin playing in the 2017-2018
season, 227 and the NFL has approved one of its franchises to relocate
to Las Vegas as early as 2019. 228 Placing a sports franchise in Las
Vegas will permit consumers to legally wager on the participating Las
Vegas teams. 229
The risk of corruption among games is heightened by the
illegality of sports wagering, not its legalization, because it is
impossible to properly determine the kind and the amount of
suspicious wagering that are altering game lines. 230 Additionally, the
black market of illegal sports gambling drives revenue which criminal
organizations use to fund “enterprises involv[ing] [] human trafficking,
racketeering, money laundering, extortion, and fraud.” 231 These acts
of extortion, among other activities, have other criminal and violent
consequences via collection methods, which involve threats of assault
or death, assault, murder, kidnapping, and destruction of the debtor’s
property. 232 Speaking at a law enforcement summit in Washington
D.C. in June 2016, FBI Chief Jay Bartholomew of the Transnational
Organized Crime Unit acknowledged that the FBI sees the strong ties

226 Howard Stutz, Survey: Americans Want Ability to Legally Wager in the Super Bowl, THE
MELLMAN GROUP (Feb. 3, 2016), http://mellmangroup.com/survey-americans-want-abilityto-legally-wager-in-the-super-bowl/.
227 Batt, supra note 223.
228 Ken Belson and Victor Mather, Raiders Leaving Oakland Again, This Time for Las
Vegas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/sports/football/nfloakland-raiders-las-vegas.html?_r=0.
229 Wagering on individual sports games is legal in Las Vegas, Nevada.
230 Game lines refers to the point spread, which is the number of points each team has either
added to or subtracted from its final score for betting purposes. Glossary, PREGAME,
http://pregame.com/EN/main/sports-betting-basics/glossary/terms/line.html (last visited Apr.
4, 2017).
231 Am. Gaming Ass’n, supra note 2.
232 See generally JAY S. ALBANESE, GAMBLING & ORGANIZED CRIME: AN ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL
CONVICTIONS
IN
2014
(2015),
http://stopillegalgambling.org/agaassets/uploads/2016/03/Albanese_Illegal_Gambling_OC_Report_2014_cases_FINAL.pdf;
see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Mass., Quincy Man
Sentenced for Running Illegal Gambling Business in Boston’s Chinatown, Using Violence to
Collect Debts (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/quincy-man-sentencedrunning-illegal-gambling-business-boston-s-chinatown-using-violence; see also Press
Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Charges 46 Leaders, Members, and Associates of Several Organized Crime Families of La
Cosa Nostra with Wide-Ranging Racketeering Charges (Aug. 4, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-charges-46-leaders-membersand-associates-several-organized-crime.
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that illegal sports wagering has to organized crime. 233 Furthermore,
because online gambling has become prominent in recent years, 234
black market gambling has become much more accessible.
However, under PASPA, the States cannot develop and enforce
a regulatory scheme to monitor wagers placed, report unusual line
movements, set age minimums and verifications, grant licenses for
sportsbooks, and establish hotlines and agencies for those who have
gambling addictions. 235 As such, PASPA should be replaced with a
federal regulation providing States with the option to authorize sports
wagering to maintain the integrity of sporting events and protect
consumers nationwide.
B. PASPA’s Self-Defeating Intent
The intent of PASPA to prohibit sports wagering was undercut
in its inception by the statute’s exceptions that permitted several States
to permit forms of sports wagering. 236 Even though the Committee of
the Judiciary believed sports wagering to be harmful, it voluntarily
chose to exempt those States that had already enacted a form of
legalized sports wagering because the Committee did not want to
threaten those economies already relying on sports wagering. 237
Additionally, a special exception was geared towards New Jersey due
to its historically unique role in the gambling industry, allowing it to
join the “grandfathered” States if it passed a law authorizing sports
wagering within one year of PASPA. 238 If PASPA was intended to
stop the corruptible, immoral activity of “fixing” games, then why
carve out exceptions for several States to legally operate sports
wagering at all? Nonetheless, Congress included exceptions, thus
233

ILLEGAL GAMBLING ADVISORY BOARD, LAW ENFORCEMENT SUMMIT ON ILLEGAL SPORTS
BETTING:
AFTER-ACTION
REPORT
9
(2015),
https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/research_files/After%20Action%20Repo
rt_PDF-Web.pdf.
234 Walt Bogdanich, James Glanz & Agustin Armendariz, Cash Drops and Keystrokes: The
Dark Reality of Sports Betting and Daily Fantasy Games, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/15/us/sports-betting-daily-fantasy-gamesfanduel-draftkings.html.
235 See Adam Silver, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-legalizesports-betting.html?_r=0.
236 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704(a) (1992).
237 S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 8 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3559.
238 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704(a)(3).
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providing a tell-tale sign that sports wagering, even when PASPA was
enacted in 1992, was not an activity that must be prohibited.

C.

Betting on Fantasy Teams Undercuts PASPA’
Central Goals

Although sports wagering is illegal in the majority of States,
participation in fantasy sports leagues 239 is regarded as legal under
federal law even when monetary compensation is provided to the
winners. In fact, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of
2006, a federal statute, expressly provides an exception for fantasy
sports. 240 Fantasy sports leagues are legal when: 1) the prize offered
is set in advance of the game and does not depend on the number of
participants; 2) “[a]ll winning outcomes reflect the relative knowledge
and skill of the participants and are determined predominantly by
accumulated statistical results of the performance” 241 of the individual
athletes; and 3) no winning outcome is based on a score, point-spread,
or performance of any single team, teams, or individual athlete. 242
Practically, this exception allows fans to enter a paid fantasy sports
league where they construct a fantasy team consisting of several
athletes, even if the entire fantasy team is composed of athletes from
the same real-life team. There is no durational requirement for the
fantasy sports leagues–a player can participate in a daily, weekly, or
season-long competition. 243
Although fantasy sports are legal under federal law, there are
differing views as to their legality among States. 244 In most States,

239 Fantasy Sports in this section refers to pay to enter fantasy sports leagues such as
DraftKings and FanDuel.
240 31 U.S.C.A. § 5362(E)(IX) (2006).
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 See id.
244 Many States have launched unsuccessful attacks on daily fantasy sports operators.
Initially, New York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman accused daily fantasy sports
operators of illegal gambling under New York law. The Attorney General issued cease-anddesist orders and was granted a temporary injunction against fantasy sports operators.
However, while an appeal of the injunction was pending, the New York State Legislature
quickly passed a bill to regulate daily fantasy sports. See Joe Drape, Fantasy Sites DraftKings
and FanDuel Stop Taking Bets in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/sports/football/draftkings-and-fanduel-stop-takingbets-in-new-york.html; see also Chris Grove, What are the States Where You Can Play Daily
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sports fantasy leagues are legal unless three elements are met: 1)
consideration; 245 2) reward; 246 and 3) chance. 247 The difference
between fantasy sports and sports wagering is that fantasy sports are
considered to be a game of strategy and skill while sports wagering is
often thought to be based on chance, driven by factors beyond a
participant’s control and not on judgment, practice, or skill. 248
Fantasy sports are primarily based on strategy and skill because
they involve drafting teams and setting lineups to maximize points,
even though players may lack familiarity with substantially all of the
athletes’ statistics. 249 Sports wagering is considered a game of chance
because individual games are a function of myriad factors, such as the
health and mood of the players and condition of the playing field.250
However, the distinction between the two is more illusory than the law
makes it seem. Weather, illness, injuries, unlucky breaks, and “off
days” are all factors, among others, that contribute to a player’s
performance that affect both the individual performer and the team. As
such, there is always an element of chance when deciding on the
outcome of a third party’s performance, regardless if the third party is
a team or individual athlete. Paid fantasy sports leagues and sports
wagering are also similar because they both require risking money to
partake in the activity, they both involve a commission taken by the
entity accepting or organizing the game, and they both involve an
activity whose outcome is uncertain. The DOJ has similarly argued
Fantasy Sports?, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT, http://www.legalsportsreport.com/daily-fantasysports-blocked-allowed-states/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
245 Consideration is a performance or promise that is bargained for in exchange of a return
promise or performance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (2013). In the context
of gambling, most courts have held consideration is providing money or valuable property in
exchange for greater winnings while some courts hold consideration to be any legal detriment
even if non-monetary in value. Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the
Law: How America Regulates its New National Pastime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 27
(2012).
246 A reward is a tangible prize that an individual gets for winning a bet. Edelman, supra
note 245, at 28.
247 Erica Buerger, Better to be Good than Lucky: Using Fantasy Sports Strategy to Defend
the Legal Status of America’s Newest Pastime, TIMELY TECH (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://illinoisjltp.com/timelytech/better-to-be-good-than-lucky-using-fantasy-sports-strategyto-defend-the-legal-status-of-americas-newest-pastime/.
248 Edelman, supra note 245, at 26-28.
249 See Why Fantasy Sports is Not Gambling: Understanding a Game of Skill, FANTASY
SPORTS TRADE ASS’N, http://fsta.org/research/why-fantasy-sports-is-not-gambling/ (last
visited Apr. 4, 2017).
250 Nat’l Football League v. Governor of State of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1385 (D. Del.
1977).
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that sports wagering involves substantial skill and “sports bettors can
employ superior knowledge of the games, teams, and players in order
to exploit odds that do not reflect the true likelihoods of the possible
outcomes.” 251 Since both fantasy sports and sports wagering involve
elements of chance, skill, and strategy, they should both be governed
under the same standard, and as such, sports wagering should be
considered legal.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Sports wagering, whether legal or illegal, is and will remain a
fact of life in the United States as amateur and professional sports
continue to rise in popularity. PASPA is an outdated law that
contributes to a thriving underground sports wagering market.
Because States have no practical options to craft a policy that regulates
sports wagering, attempts to minimize or eliminate the underground
market have been unsuccessful.
Pursuant to the Commerce Clause, 252 Congress can regulate
certain economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce when aggregated. 253 However, the anti-commandeering
doctrine under the Tenth Amendment limits Congress’s power by
prohibiting Congress from directly compelling a State legislature to
require or prohibit acts contained in federal laws. 254 Even though
Congress can regulate some intrastate activity under the Commerce
Clause, it cannot regulate a State government’s regulation of these
activities. 255
Outside of the grandfathered States, PASPA prohibits State
governments from “sponsor[ing], operat[ing], advertis[ing],
promot[ing], licens[ing], or authoriz[ing] by law” sports wagering.256
Although Congress created exceptions for several States to continue
operating sportsbooks, it intended, by enacting PASPA, to: 1) stop the
spread of sports gambling; 2) maintain the integrity of America’s
251

Brief for Appellant at 29-30, U.S. v. Discristina, 726 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 123720), 2012 WL 6800562, at *30. The DOJ argued that the federal law that defines gambling
includes games of skill, e.g., sports wagering, and therefore, should also include poker, which
is also a game of skill. Id.
252 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
253 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
254 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
255 Id.
256 28 U.S.C.A. § 3702 (1992).
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national pastime, both amateur and professional sports; and 3) reduce
the promotion of sports gambling among America’s youth. 257
The Third Circuit’s decisions essentially leave the States with
only one choice: prohibit all sports wagering. By preventing States
from repealing their sports wagering laws, PASPA is in essence
compelling States to enforce federal legislation in violation of the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment. There is no
accountability by the federal government nor recourse through the
state political process to change the policy because the States are
forced to do Congress’s bidding by keeping state prohibitions in place.
The American public, the President, league commissioners,
owners of professional teams, and members of the federal government
all agree that it is time to repeal PASPA and allow all States the
opportunity to permit sports wagering. 258 Regardless of its legality,
sports wagering is prominent in the U.S. and is currently catering to
criminal organizations through their operation of underground sports
wagering services, which jeopardize the integrity of sports and safety
of the consumer, and remove billions of dollars of tax revenue from
States and local communities. It is time for Congress to accept that
gambling is here to stay and should be brought into the legal realm so
that it can finally be regulated.
In conclusion, as a matter of policy, Congress should repeal
PASPA and enact a new framework that will permit and regulate sports
wagering effectively. On constitutional grounds, PASPA should be
deemed unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment as it compels the
States, without another alternative, to do Congress’s bidding.

257
258

S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555.
See supra Part V, Section A.
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